BACKGROUND

Did the Italian campaign ultimately constitute a Churchillian thrust into the ‘soft underbelly of Europe’ or was it the strategic sideshow predicted by many, including most of the American high command? The answer, as so often with the big questions in history, depends on the criteria used to measure success. Viewed purely as a military exercise in gaining ground, the campaign was an Allied failure. The secondary nature of the theatre, the weather and terrain, German tactical excellence and high level command failures on the Allied side all conspired to prevent the dramatic military breakthrough that might have caused history to re-evaluate the campaign. It also has to be said that it is doubtful that any success, no matter how staggering, could have decisively affected the outcome of the war, which was being settled on the Russian front.

However, war has always been about more than just lines on a map. The Italian campaign was the almost inevitable outcome of Churchill’s successful politicking, which had convinced Roosevelt to support Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Once the Allied war machine had been cranked up and aimed at the Mediterranean, it was easy to find any number of plausible reasons why further operations in the theatre were necessary. This situation perfectly suited Churchill and the British command, who wished to avoid what they saw as a premature confrontation with the German army in the European theatre in 1943. They were successful in this, and as the Allies initial lack of progress in Normandy in 1944 showed, their caution may well have been justified, as the German defenders of Europe in 1943 would have been a much tougher proposition.

As well as avoiding a high risk invasion, the Italian campaign provided other benefits. The Allied war machine, at all levels, still had a lot to learn about warfare, as embarrassing reverses in North Africa at Kasserine and elsewhere had already shown. The technical mastery of amphibious warfare shown at Normandy would surely not have been possible without the experience gained in battle in the various Mediterranean operations. It was also useful and necessary to show both the Russians and the home front that the Germans were being confronted. In some ways, Allied soldiers in the Italian campaign were like the airmen of Bomber Command. They were thrown against the enemy as a necessity of war, and the fact that these battles were not on the direct path to victory does not in the slightest diminish their dedication or sacrifice. Their German opponents showed similar dedication, and could at least console themselves with the thought that they were not serving on the Russian front.

Far removed from lofty strategic considerations, the fighting in the Italian Campaign was some of the hardest of the war. Conditions in Sicily were relatively benign, and the Germans were content to fight a delaying campaign, withdrawing more or less at their convenience. However, terrain and weather on almost all of the Italian mainland were perversely unsuited to offensive operations by a modern mechanised army and these factors, together with the fighting abilities of the German army meant that Allied attacks were usually made at great cost for little gain

REQUIREMENTS

AVAILABILITY

As of 5th May 2005 - Very Soon

SCREEN SHOTS

1st Airborne to the rescue

Allied forces struggle to expand the Salerno bridgehead

British forces start the long trek north to Naples

British landings on Sicily

British open the way to Catania

Defensive line forms in front of the British

Last line of defence at Anzio

No easy way through the Gustav line

Operation Avalanche

Operation Husky

Operation Shingle

The Anzio bridgehead is contained

US paras take casualties

MUSIC

Battles In Italy samples original music of the third reich produced by Tomahawk Films.